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Case No. 7680

In the Sttpreme Court
of the State of Utah
GREAT A~fERICAX
a corporation,

INDE~fNITY

COMPANY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

W. S. BERRYESSA and FRANK BERRYESSA,
Defendants and Respondents.
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
This is an action brought by plaintiff (appellant)
against the defendant W. S. Berryessa, (the defendant
Frank Berryessa could not be served with summons by
reason of his absence from the State of Utah), upon a
joint and several promissory note executed by defendants. Defendant W. S. Berryessa admitted the execution of the note, admitted default in the monthly payment, admitted his refusal to pay, and demanded a cancellation of the note as to him, based upon the alleged
ground of duress and want of consideration. By way of
counterclaim, defendant also prayed for judgment
against plaintiff for the return of $1550.00 paid by defendant to plaintiff and also for the return of an uncashed check in the sum of $500.00, based upon the same
grounds. Trial to a jury resulted in a verdict in favor
of defendant, cancelling the note, and also for a return
of the $1500.00 and the uncashed check.
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Much of the evidence is without conflict. However
there was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to what
occurred at a meeting which was alleged to have occurred
in the office of J. G. Hagman on June 6, 1950. We shall
very briefly summarize the evidence.
Defendant W. S. Berryessa is the father of the
defendant Frank Berryessa. Frank Berryessa was an
employee of the Eccles Hotel Company, which operates
the Hotel Ben Lomond at Ogden, Weber County, Utah.
Plaintiff isst1ed a surety bond guaranteeing the honesty
and integrity of said employee.
About the forepart of January, 1950, the hotel discovered a shortage in the cash entrusted to Frank
Berryessa. When confronted with the accusation, hr
admitted the same, but the amount was then undetermined. The father was informed of the shortage. He
immediately came to the office of the hotel, accompanied
by Frank, and had a talk with Irvine F. Keller, the
company auditor. The defendant stated that he was
prepared to make good any and all losses and was very
insistent on keeping the matter quiet and not reporting
it to the bonding company. At that .time it was more
or less assumed that the shortage involved only the
so-called ''cash account,'' and the shortage was thought
to be in the neighborhood of $2000.00. Defendant insisted on signing a note to the hotel company for the
amount of the assumed shortage, aggregating $2000.00.
Later the hotel discovered discrepancies and apparent
shortages in what is referred to as the "ledger account"
and then it became evident that the shortage would be
greater than at first anticipated. However, defendant
insisted that whatever the amount he was prepared to
C)
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make it g-ood. \Yhen the auditor~ began lllYL't'tigating
the ledg·er aecounts, Frank, of course, knew of the
shortage and also kne\Y it would be discovered. l-Ie
thereupon wrote a list of the ledg-er accounts on a small
piece of paper, which aggregated some $4000.00 or thereabouts, and handed the ~arne to his wife and then apparently fled the state. His wife then handed this list
to the defendant, suggesting, however, that the same
be not given to the hotel but that they wait developments and see if the hotel was successful in finding the
same. However, the defendant, in a subsequent intervie''?, handed the list to 1\'Ir. Keller, and defendant again
insisted tha! he was prepared to take care of the shortage. He explained that he had fortunately just sold
some property to Safe,,.ray, from which he was realizing
a substantial profit, and that he would have funds available to make good the shortage.
When it had been established that the shortage
would aggregate around $6500.00, Campbell Eccles,
:Manager of the hotel, called defendant and told him that
in view of the amount involved he felt duty-bound to
notify the bonding company, and the defendant concurred in his conclusion. Eccles thereupon notified the
plaintiff's agent of the shortage. Plaintiff referred
the rna tter to J. G. Hagman, :Manager of the Insurance
Adjustment Company, to adjust the loss. Mr. Hagman
came to Ogden and met defendant at the hotel. At that
time 1Ir. Hagman suggested to defendant that he ought
to bring Frank back and he stated that he would do so.
There was some general talk a~out the financial responsibility of the members of the family, including a sonin-law who had a ranch in New :Mexico. Defendant did
3
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have Frank return to Ogden, and Hagman and the defendants and !1:r. Keller met at the hotel. A general
conversation ensued concerning the accounts and the
shortages and the circumstances leading up to the same.
At a subsequent meeting between the same parties
and after the auditor had made a full and complete
audit, Frank si2;ned the same, (Defendant's Exhibit 1),
in which he admitted the accuracy of the auditor's
report. After that Frank and defendant went down to
Salt Lake to Hagman's office, and some general discussions were had with respect to Frank's ability to
make good the loss. Frank insisted that he had turned
some $2000.00 of the shortage to his brother-in-law, Roy
Patterson, and Hagman suggested that if such was the
case, then the brother-in-law should be willing to sign
a note with defendant and Frank, and as a result of the
discussion Hagman prepared a note for $4678.40 (the
same being the difference between the admitted shortage and the note previously signed by Frank and the
defendant and delivered to the hotel.) The ·note was
made payable to the plaintiff and provided for payments
at the rate of $250.00 quarterly, commencing June I,
1950. It was assumed and apparently tacitly agreed and
understood that the note to be signed by Frank, Roy
Patterson, and the defendant. Frank took the unsigned
note and he and ~is father then left Hagman's office.
Later on defendant and, Frank returned to Hagman's
office with the note unsigned. Frank stated that the
brother-in-law either would not sign the note or they
had not been able to contact him. Up to this point
there is no contention on the part of defendant that
anything improper had occurred and no contention made

J
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of any dure8s prior to this meeting. (Tr. 56) The testimony all reflects a situation where the defendant appeared to be most anxious to be of financial assistance
to Frank, and in Yie,\· of his previous declarations that
he was prepared to assi8t him in making good the loss,
it seemed to be at least tacitly understood and accepted
as a fact that the defendant intended to sign a note
with Frank for the amount of the shortage, and the
suggestion apparently had come from defendant, right
from the first meeting, that he intended to and wanted
to do so.
We make this explanation at this point in order to
lay the foundation for what the defendant claims took
place at a meeting which he said occurred in Hagman's
office on June 6, 1950, but \Vhich did not occur on that
date, and the signing of the note did not occur at that
time or place, as first testified by defendant.
Concerning this matter we quote in full the direct
testimony of the defendant commencing on page 20 to
the end of page 22 :

'' Q Now, you started to tell us about a later meeting that you had.
A Later we took that note, Frank and I took

the note back to l\fr. Hagman and told him
Roy wouldn't sign the note, or hadn't signed
it.

Q Now, just one meeting, can we fix the approximate time of the meeting you are now
speaking of1
A I think this second meeting was June s1x,
as I remember.
5
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.Q So you are now down to a meeting that you
had with Mr. Hagman on June 6, 1950.
A Yes.
Q Which is the date that the note in question
bears.
A Yes.

Q All right. Now, who was present at that
meeting and where was it held~
A Held in Mr. Hagman's office in the Continental Building in Salt Lake City.

Q And who was present¥
A Mr. Hagman, Frank, and I.

Q All right. Now, will you state in substance
and effect what transpired at that meeting?
You have spoken of taking the unsigned note
back.
A Well, as I remember 1\fr. Hagman wanted
me to sign that note, and I refused to sign
that note because I couldn't pay that amount,
and I knew Frank couldn't pay that amount.

Q Now, what amount are you speaking

of~

A $250.00 a quarter.

Q And that was a note made out for the full
$6800.00.
A As I remember, yes. We argued back and
forth about this note; Mr. Hagman got angry
and swore and pounded the desk with his fist,
and said, 'You can't come here and tell me
what you will do. ' I said, 'I can't sign that
note because I can't pay it.' We talked for
a while. He said, 'what can you pay,' and
6
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I said, 'I don't think \W' enn pn~' more than
$50.00 n month,' and he said, 'at $f10.00 :1
month, yon 'II never !.':et this pairl.' Then lw
agreed to make the note out, and I ·war-;; to nn v
him $2,000.00 ensh and sig11 the note "'''ith
Frank, making the note payable at $50.00 a
month. We signed that note, and I rome
back to Ogden and took a mortgage on my
home.

Q Now, let's stop right there a minute. Was
this note for $4865.20 prepared on the occasion of this .June 6th meeting in l\fr. Hageman's office?
A Yes. l\[r. Hagman had his secretary make
that note out while we were there.

Q And was it signed at that time'
A It was signed at that time.

Q And was it left with l\Ir. Hagman?
A Yes. It was left with Mr. Hagman.

Q And is that the note which has been introduced in evidence as plaintiff's exhibit A'
A Yes, as far as I know that is the exact note.

Q Now, you have spoken of a statement made
by :\Ir. Hagman as to what would happen if
you didn't do as you were told. Was anything said as to what would happen if you
did do what you were told?
A Mr. Hagman told me if we would sign the
note and I would make that payment that he
wouldn't prosecute Frank, but if I didn't he
would have to prosecute him.

Q Now, following the signing of that note and
your agreement to pay two thousand dollars
7
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as you have testified to, you returned to
Ogden with Frank.
A Yes.

Q Anri what did you do in connection with the
two thousand dollars~
A Well, I went to the loan companies and
borrowed money to pay two thousand dollars.
I owed on my improvements on the place,
and I only had $1500.00 left to pay Mr. Hagman. I got a cashiers check dated July 3,
and it was made out to me, but I signed it
over to the adjustment company.

Q Well, now, when did you see Mr. Hagman
again after this June 6th meeting?
A I think the Fourth of July. I wouldn't be
sure. I got the check out on the third of
July. I think it was the Fourth, and Mr.
Hagman came down to my home, and I gave
him that cashiers check for $1500.00 and my
personal check for $500.00, and I asked him
if he would hold that personal check until
I could take out a further loan and meet it,
and he said that he would.

Q As you recall that, that was about July four.
A Yes. I think it was. It was soon after I got
that check. I think it was July four because
I was around home working when Mr. Hagman drove up.

Q And at that time you endorsed over to him
this cashier's check for $1500.00 and gave him
your personal check for $500.00.

A Yes.
8
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Q Which made up t1w two thousand dollars
which yon agreed to pay.

A Yes."
The defendant also testified that he personally paid
$50.00 on the note for the July payment, but that the
other $200.00 which ·was paid on the note was paid by
Frank or his "ife.
The defendant was then asked the following question (Tr. 26):

"Q Now, :Mr. Berryessa, I come back to this June
6 meeting with :Mr. Hagman and the occasion
for your having signed the $4800.00 note
exhibit A and ask you if you would have
signed that note bad it not been for the statements made by Mr. Hagman on that occasion~"

Over plaintiff's objection, the Court permitted the defendant to make the following answer:
''A No. I would not have signed that check because I knew, that note because I knew I
couldn't meet it because I have my aged
mother to take care of and my wife, and I
have other obligations I have to pay. I knew
I couldn't pay that much money and keep my
payments paid up.''
The defendant was then asked:

"Q Now, I'll ask you if you would have signed
that note at that time had it not been for the
statements Mr. Hagman, as testified to by
you, that if you did sign Frank would not he
criminally prosecuted.''
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Over the objection of the plaintiff the Court permitted
the defendant to make the following answer:
"A No I would not have sig-ned that. That i~
the only reason I signed it is to keep Frank
from g~ing to the penitentiary.''
The defendant was then asked this question at page 27:

"Q Now, coming to .July three or four, the date
on which von turned over to Mr. HRQTil:ln
the endor~ed cashiers check for $1500.00,
would you have paid that amount of money
to him on that date had it not been for the
previous statements made by Mr. Hagman
on June 6?''
Over plaintiff's objection the Court permitted the witness to answer, ''No.''
The witness was then asked the question:

'' Q Or would you have given him the $500.00
personal check, had it not been for thm;e
statements made on June 6?''
Again, over the objection of the plaintiff, the Court
permitted the defendant to make the following answer:
"A No. I gave him that check to make up the two
thousand dollars that I had promised him
that other meeting to pay. I tried my best
to pay it, but I just couldn't make it."

j

l

Notwithstanding the defendant's positive and unequivocal statement that the note in question was signed
by defendant at Hagman's office on June 6th, the defendant, when confronted with positive evidence to the
contrary, reluctantly admitted that this statement was
untrue, and he admitted that he did not go to Salt Lake

10
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City on J nne 6th a~ testified to b~' him, but that he,
his wife, and Frank went down to Hagman's office on
Sunday, June 4th; that a~ a result of that visit I-Iagman
prepared the note in question on the following day,
June 5th, and forwarded the same by letter to the defendant addressed nt Ogden, Ftah, and that the defendant signed the note in Ogden on about J nne 6th
and mailed the signed note ·with the original letter back
to ~Ir. Hagman in Salt Lake City about June 6th or a
day or two thereafter. (See Tr. 41 to 47)
The foregoing eYiclence. as testified to by defendant
on direct examination and as modified by his admissions
on cross-examination, cons'i:itutes all of the evidence in
this case upon which the defendant bases his claim that
the note was signed under duress and ,,,ithout consideration. There was also introduced in evidence, as a part
of defendant's cross-examination, plaintiff's Exhibits
C, D, E, F, and G. These exhibits were letters written
hy the defendant to the plaintiff on the respective dates
which they bear, all of them being subsequent in time to
the meeting of June 4th. They show on their face the
voluntary acts and conduct of the defendant. Plaintiff
then had marked for identification Exhibit H. However
the letter "~'as not offered in evidence because it was not
written by the defendant and in order to keep the record
straight the plaintiff then offered in evidence, as Plaintiff's Exhibit I, a letter written by defendant, which
was objected to by defendant and his objection sustained. At this point it should be noted that Mr. Hagman positively and emphatically denied that he made
the statements attributed to him by the defendant at
the meeting in his office on June 4th.
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1. The Court improperly permitted defendant to answer the following question:

"Q Now, Mr. Berryessa, I come back to this June
6th meeting with Mr. Hagman and the occasion for you having signed the $4800 note,
Exhibit A, and ask you if you would have
signed the note had it not been for the statements made by Mr. Hagman on that occasion?" (Tr. 26)
and similar questions propounded to the defendant.
(Tr. 26 and 27)
POINT 2. The Court improperly refused to allow
appellant to introduce Exhibit I, the same being a letter
written by defendant to plaintiff, (Tr. 51), which said
offer was renewed in the absence of the jury. (Tr. 55)
POINT 3. The evidence of the defendant was insufficient to justify the submission to the jury of the
issues of duress or want of consideration, and plaintiff's
motion for a directed verdict as to the note sued on
should have been g-ranted. (Tr. 58) Renewed at conclusion of trial. (Tr. 124)
POINT 4. The evidence was insufficient to justify
the submission to the jury of the issue of defendant's
right to recover the $1550 and check for $500 set forth
in defendant's counterclaim, and plaintiff's motion for
dismissal of defendant's counterclaim should have been
granted. (Tr. 58) Renewed at conclusion of trial. (Tr.
124)
12
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POIX'r 5. The Court erred in the giving of certain
instn1etions, the giving of which were excepted to by
appellant. (Tr. 13-!)
POINT 6. The Court erred in its refusal to give to
the jury certain instructions as requested by appellant,
to which exceptions were taken. ( Tr. 133)
POIX'r 7. The appellant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding· the verdict and for a new trial should
haYe been granted.
ARGUMENT
Point 1. Over plaintiff's objection, the Court permitted the defendant to answer the question as to
whether he, defendant, would have signed the note had
it not been for the statement made by Mr. Hagman on
that occasion and similar questions propounded to defendant, all of which appear in the transcript at pages
26 and 27. It is plaintiff's position that the Court
should have sustained plaintiff's objection to this question for the following reasons:
A. It called for a conclusion of the witness on the
ultimate fact which the jury was to determine.
B. The answer to whether the defendant would or
would not have signed the note had it not been for the
alleged statements is no proof of duress.
As we conceive and understand the law of duress,
it involves much more than the mere question as to
whether the defendant would or would not have signed
the note in question had it not been for the statements
claimed to have been made by Hagman. The question
was whether or not the alleged duress brought about a

13
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mental condition whereby the defendant's will was entirely overcome by reason of the alleged threats, so that
his act in signing was not the act of the defendant but
was in effect the act of the alleged perpetrator of the
duress. We shall discuss this matter further when we
discuss the law applicable to duress.
Point 2. We think that the Court clearly erred in
refusing to admit plaintiff's Exhibit I in evidence. It
certainly had some bearing on the question of the state
of mind of the defendant when the letter was written
and was certainly competent evidence going to his state
of mind. We also think the Court erred when the offer
was again renewed at the close of the defendant's testimony and in the absence of the jury. (See Tr. 55) It
seems to us that where the question involves the state
of mind of the defendant when he signed the note and
also when he made the subsequent payments, any evidance, if not too remote in time and certainly it cannot
be claimed that this was too remote, which might have
a bearing upon the state of mind of the signer, is competent and should have been received.
Point 3. At the conclusion of the defendant's evidence, plaintiff moved the Court for a directed verdict
as to the legality of the note in question, which motion
was overruled and denied. At this point it is admitted
that there may have been some question as to whether
or not the acceleration provisions of the note permitted
the plaintiff to recover the full amount of the note and
on this point the Court concluded that all that ' was
necessary was to have the jury determine whether or
not the note was a valid note and leave the legal question
of whether the plaintiff could accelerate the note to he

~

j
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decided as a question of law. No complaint is made by
plaintiff as to this ruling of the Court and when plaintiff
renewed its motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the trial the motion was so modified as to
embrace this point. The question, therefore, presented
by the plaintiff is whether or not there was sufficient
evidence of duress or want of consideration to submit
that issue to the jury, and it makes no difference so far
as plaintiff is concerned whether it can accelerate the
note or not. The only question is whether the note is a
Yalid obligation.
The reason for the bringing of the action is this :
In December of 1950, defendant brought suit against
the Insurance Adjustment Company to have the note
declared invalid. However, defendant did not sue the
owner of the note, Great American Indemnity Company,
and that suit was dismissed. The plaintiff, therefore,
concluded to bring this suit when the December payment was not made.
Let us analyze the testimony of the defendant in
the light of admitted surrounding circumstances for the
purpose of determining whether or not there is any
evidence upon which the issue of duress could be sub~
mitted to the jury.
According to the defendant's own version, at the
time the first note was prepared it provided for a payment of $250.00 each quarter. According to defendant's version of what occurred on June 4th, he said
that l\Ir. Hagman wanted him to sign that note, which
he refused to sign because he couldn't pay that amount,
that is, he couldn't pay the $250.00 per quarter. Defend15
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ant's objection to signing the note as originally prepared
was based solely on the ground that the payment of
$250.00 each quarter was more than he and Frank could
pay. Of course defendant now tries to make it appear
that he was the one who would have to pay the note,
notwithstanding the fact that the party primarily liable
was his son Frank, and the discussion as to the amount
which could be paid centered around Frank's ability
rather than the defendant's ability to pay off the obH~;ation, and the defendant says that at this meeting "We
argued back and forth about this note and Hagman got
angry and swore and pounded the desk with his fist
and said 'You can't come here and tell me what you will
do,' " to which defendant replied, "I can't sign that
note (the original note) because I can't pay it." He
testified, "Hagman said 'What can you pay~' and I
said 'I don't think we can pay more than $50.00 a month,'
and he said 'At $50.00 a month you'll never get this
paid.' ''
However, it is interesting to note that Hagman then
agreed to prepare a new note providing for a payment
of $50.00 per month instead of $250.00 per quarter. In
other words, even under defendant's own testimony he
was the one who suggested that the original note calling for $250.00 a quarter was more than he and Frank
could pay, but he thought that they could pay $50.00
a month, and upon making this suggestion, according to
his reluctant admissions on cross-examination, they left
the office, it being a Sunday, and Hagman advised them
he would have such a note prepared and mail it to them
in Ogden. The note was received by defendant, prepared strictly in accordance with his own suggestions,
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and was not signed until two days after the alleged
meeting and after he had ample time to seek advice
and to recover the full possession of his faculties, even
assuming any loss of his reasoning faculty by the claimed
threats. It was of course very e.asy for him to take
the witness stand after he attempted to rescind the
contract and say ·that he would not have signed the
note had it not been for the alleged threats, but' we submit that his whole course of dealings indicates that
this conclusion, arrived at many months after the transaction, is contrary to all of the facts in this case. Even
though Mr. Hagman said, as contended by defendant,
that "You can't come here and tell me what you ·will
do,'' and even though !Ir. Hagman told him that if he
would sign the note they wouldn't prosecute Frank but
if he didn't they would have to prosecute him, yet we
contend that this evidence, when considered in the light
of all the admitted facts and circumstances in conneetion with the case, falls far short of provin~ duress
as that term has been defined, not only by this Court,
but by many other courts. We rely principally upon the
case of
Ellison vs. Pingree,
64 Utah 479,
231 Pac. 827,
and
Fox vs. Piercey,
________________ Utah ________________ ,
227 P. 2d 763.

In the Pingree case, this Court quotes with approval
13 C. J., Page 396,
Section 310,
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in which the Court says:
"Duress is that degree of constraint or dan~er,
either actually inflicted or threatened and Impending, which is sufficient in severity or apprehension to overcome the mind of a person of
ordinary firmness.''
Again this Court quotes with approval
1 Page on Contracts,
Section 496 :
''A person in his right mind and in full control
of his faculties, who understands what he is
doing and who has full power to enter into a
legal transaction or to refuse to do so, does not
act under duress if he enters into such transaction.''
And in the Pingree case the Court sustained the lower
Court in its finding that there was no evidence of
duress.
We have already alluded to the question raised
under Point 1, and here again we desire to revert to this
proposition.
We contend that there is no evidence that when the
defendant signed this note on July 6th, two days after
the meeting in Salt Lake City, that he was not in full
control of his faculties. We contend that he understood
perfectly what he was doing and he had the mental
capacity to either enter into or refuse to execute the
note ; that he had at least two days' time to reflect and
to seek advice. It seems to us that with no showing
whatsoever that he ·was in any state of mental confusion
that for him to be permitted to merely say 'I would not
}).ave signed this note had it not been for the state-
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ments made,'' when considered in the light of all of the
undisputed fact~ and circumstances surrounding the
transaction, amounts to no evidence whatsoever of duress
or compulsion. \V P reserve for further discussion under
Point -!the question of a delay in acting after the alleged
duress has been imposed.

In
17 C.J.S., Page 531,
Section 172,
the author says:
••_.Mere threats of criminal prosecution are not
enough. There must be a reasonable ground for
apprehension that the threat will be carried into
execution and it must also appear that the
threats operated on the mind on the party so as
to overcome his will.''
The following cases cite the general rule of law
governing duress:
Pugh-Miller Drilling Company
vs. ::\Iain Oil Company,
276 Pac. 1043.
Winget vs. Rockwood,
69 F. 2d 323
White vs. Scan·itt,
111 s.w. 2d 18
Sulzner vs. Cappsan-Lumley
Company, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 421

It is also well-established that a person may waive
the defense of duress by subsequent conduct. See
Dairy Company Operative Association
vs. Brands Creamery, 30 P. 2d 338
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17 C.J.S., Page 529, Section
169, and cases cited.
CONSIDEHATION
That there was a valid consideration for the signing of the note cannot be questioned. See
Spear vs. Ryan,
208 Pac. 1069.
Certainly when the payee of the note accepted the joint
signatures of the defendant and his son, and thereby extended to the son additional time in which to make payment of the obligation which he admitedly owed, this
of itself constitutes sufficient consideration for the
signing of the note by the defendant.
We will discuss this more in detail under Point 5
relating to instructions.
Point 4. Plaintiff moved for a dismissal of defendant's counterclaim wherein he sought to recover
the $1,550.00 which he had already paid and the return
of his uncashed personal check for $500.00. The trial
court overruled and denied this motion and also denied
a similar motion made at the conclusion of the taking
of evidence and overruled and denied plaintiff's requested instruction number two, all of which raised the
same point, that is, whether or not there was any evidence to submit to the jury as to defendant's right to
recover on the counterclaim. We contend that even
assuming there was sufficient evidence to go to the
jury as to the question of duress and failure of consideration in procuring defendant's signature to the
note, yet the recovery back of money subsequently paid

~
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he freely and voluntarily endorsed the cashier's check
stands on an entirely different approach and that our
motions to dismiss the counterclaim should have been
granted. It must be remembered that defendant makes
no claim of any alleged duress imposed subsequent to
the meeting· of June 4th. Yet on July 4th, a month later,
for $1,500.00 and delivered the same to Hagman and
then wrote his personal check for $500.00, but requested
Hagman to hold the same for a short time .. Then at a
later date be freely and voluntarily paid the $50.00
installment on the note representing the July payment.
It must also be remembered that he never at any time
made any protest of any kind or character whatsoever
with respect to the making of these payments, nor did
he in any manner protest or attempt to repudiate the
transaction until the following December and during
this interim he wrote several letters to Hagman. See
·Exhibits C, D, E and F. In none of such letters did
he suggest any duress or improper conduct. But on
the contrary his letters were friendly and courteous and
indicated a friendly and courteous relationship. We
contend that this evidence conclusively established the
fact that the transaction of July 4th and the subsequent
payment of the $50.00 constituted what amounts in law
to a voluntary payment which cannot be recovered
back. In this connection we desire first of all to call
to the court's attention the following language set forth
in the case of
Fox vs. Piercey,
Cited supra.
''In view of the fact that this case is determined upon the considerations discussed above,
it is unnecessary to resolve the problem sug-
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gested by appellant regarding the lapse of time
between the alleged threats and the presentation
of Fox's resignation. We do not disagree with
the contention that, even if duress had been practiced, an act done after sufficient time had elapsed for fear to disappear would not be voidable
for duress. (Italics added.)
This matter is discussed in
48 C.J., commencing at page 734,
Section 280 to Section 311, inclusive.
We quote from the text the following found on Page
749, Section 300 :
''Where no warrant has been issued or proceedings begun, and there is no immediate danger,
a payment with full knowledge of the facts will
not, as a general rule, be deemed compulsory
so as to entitle the payor to recover it back, by
reason of the fact that the payment is made under
a mere apprehension or threat of a criminal
prosecution. However, demands and threats of
persons clothed with governmental authority to
carry them into execution by arrest and prosecution stand on a different footing from demands
and threats of private individuals, and money
paid because thereof, if unwarranted, may generally be recovered back, as in such cases the
parties do not stand on equal footing.
Cases in support of the foregoing text are cited in the
notes.
The subject is also discussed in
70 C.J.S., commencing on Page
350, Section 146
to 149, inclusive.
and in
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48 C.J., commencing at
Pag-e 7~14, Section 280.
The defendant admits that he is a man of more
than average intelligence. He has been a school teacher
for many years. Several members of this family with
whom he was in constant touch had attained eminence
in the field of education. It seems incredible that a man
of that training· and experience could wait a month and
then be permitted to say that when he made this payment he was acting under duress claimed to have been
invoked a month previous. There is no evidence in
this case that the defendant was ever acting under fear
or that his mind was in the slightest degree coerced by
anything that was said or done on June 4th, even according the defendant every reasonable inperence as
contained in his own testimony. Defendant himself
realized the weakness of his case and so he c-laimed on
direct examination that he signed the note in Hagman's office when the threat was made. He also claimed
that the first note which provided for a payment of
$250.00 a quarter provided for the entire amount of the
shortage and from that tried to infer that the demand
for the $2,000.00 was induced under threats of duress.
He was forced to admit that both of these statements
were and are absolutely untrue. It is a case which
comes very close to perjury because when confronted
with documentary evidence he had to admit that his
story was absolutely untrue. The original note of April
19th for $250.00 quarterly was produced. It provided
for payment of $4,678.40. The fact that the note as
finally signed was not signed in the office at all has
already been alluded to. We say, therefore, that there
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was no competent evidence to submit to a jury that on
July 4th, when the defendant paid the $1500.00 and
gave his check for $500.00, the payment was induced by
any duress then and there existing which overcame the
mind of the defendant.
Point 5. ·_rhe Court in its instructions to the jury
in Instruction No. 1 stated :
"The second defense is that even if it should be
determined that such duress has not been proven,
nevertheless the only consideration for his signing the note was the promise of plaintiff's agent,
J. G. Hagman, Jr., that if he would sign, Frank
Berryessa would not be criminally prosecuted,
and that such consideration is illegal and insufficient to support the note. You are instructed
that either of these defenses, if established by a
proponderance of the evidence, is a sufficient
and adequate defense to plaintiff's action against
the defendant W. S. Berryessa.''
Plaintiff duly excepted to the foregoing instruction.
In Instruction No. 6 the Court instructed the jury
as follows:
''You are instructed that the note sued upon by
the plaintiff is invalid against the defendant W.
S. Berryessa if not supported by a valuable consideration. A promissory note given for the suppression of a criminal prosecution is against public policy and cannot be enforced between the
parties and it is immaterial whether the individual as to whom the criminal prosecution is
suppressed was guilty or innocent. Accordingly,
if you find from a proponderance of the evidence
that the defendant W. S. Berryessa signed the
note sued upon by the plaintiff in consideration
24
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of plaintiff's promise, through itt' agent .J. G.
Hagman, .Jr., that Frank Berryessa would, not
be criminally prosecuted for his defalcation, the
note is invalid as to the defendant W. S. Berryessa and you must so find.''
Plaintiff likewise excepted to this instruction.
Our objection to that portion of Instruction No. 1
quoted supra is this: It gives the jury the iden that
there are two separate and distjnct defenses to the
validity of the transaction : One. duress, and the other,
failnre nf consideration, and the Court specificallv tells
the jury that if either of thPse defenses i~ established
by a preponderHnce of the evidence, the plaintiff cannot
recover. Tn other words, the Court. by this instruetion
anrl that portion of Im:;truction No. 6. g-ives to the i1nv
the idea that even thoug-h duress i~ not proven, yet the
jury may still brinq: in a verdict in favor of the defendant for want of consideration. As we have heretofore
pointed ont, there can be no question but what there was
a consideration sufficient to support defendant's sig-nin~ of the promissory note. A joint payee or endorser
of a promissory note cannot defeat the action even
though he personally receives no benefit from the
transaction. This, of course, is fundamental. The consideration in this case which would support the note is
the acceptance by plaintiff of a promissory note wherein
and whereby Frank Berryessa is given an extension of
time in which to pay an obligation which he admits to
be presently due. The only question, therefore, in this
case, as we see it, is whether or not the obtaining of
the defendant's signature to the note was obtained by
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duress or coercion, as that term is legally defined. If
there was duress, then the note is invalid because of the
duress, which some courts refer to as a failure of consideration.
In the case of
Brane vs. First National Bank,
20 P. 2d 506,
the Court says :
''Both parties recognize the fact that the question
of want of consideration is incident to and logically a part of the question of duress, so that the
duress feature is the sole and only question
here involved.''
We contend that the Court, by g:tVIng of that
portion of Instruction No. 1 and Instruction No. 6, necessarily confused the jury into thinking that even though
defendant failed to prove duress by a preponderance
of the evidence, yet plaintiff cannot recover because
there was a failure of consideration. In this we think
the Court committed prejudicial error.
Point 6. Plaintiff requested the Court to give its
Requested Instructions No. 1 and No. 2. This question
has already been discussed under Points 3 and 4.
Plaintiff requested the Court to give its Requested
Instruction No. 3. The Court, in its Instruction No. 4,
adopted a portion of this requested instruction but it is
to be noted that the Court left out of its Instruction No.
4 the following which is contained in plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 3:
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''Duress will not ordinarily invalidate a promissory note entered into after opportunity for deliberate action.''
We think the Conl"t should haYe included in its definition the foregoing phrase because the evidence showed
conclusiYel~~ that the note in question was not signed at
the time of the alleged duress but two or three days later
and the payment of the $1550.00 was made over a month
later.
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 4 was refused.
We think the plaintiff "\vas entitled to have thjs instruction given to the jury. It is certainly a correct statement of the law, as pronounced by this Court in the
Ellison case, and we do not believe that the giving of
Instruction K o. 6 embraces this legal concept.
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 was partially covered by the Court's Instn1etion No. 5, but the
Court refused to include therein the following:
''It is the law that payments voluntarily made
cannot be recovered back, even though the original transaction was entered into under duress.
To entitle the defendant to recover any payments
made hr him to the plaintiff, it is encumbant
upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the duress which induced the defendant to sign said note, if you
find as a fact that such duress actually existed,
continued in the mind of the defendant at the
time the defendant made said payments, and
that such duress controlled the mind of the dedendant to the extent that said payments or
either of them was made under and by reason
of said duress and \\~as therefore not a voluntary
payment.''
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The Court in its entire instructions failed to define
the term "voluntary payment," although it was expressly made an issue in this case, and we think it was
prejudicial error not to do so. Certainly the plaintiff was entitled to have its theory presented to the jury.
In plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 7 was a
request embodied upon the theory of a waiver of the
defense of duress. It is well-established that duress
may he waived and the contract ratified by the injured
party after the duress bas been removed.
17 C. J. S., Page 529,
Section 169
70 C. J. S., Page 134
White vs. Scarritt,
111 s. w. 2d 18
The evidence in this case showed that a month after
the alleged duress the defendant paid the $1500.00, in
accordance with his agreement; that thereafter he paid
another $50.00; that between June 4, 1950 and December 1, 1950 the defendant repeatdly acknowledged the
obligation by letters as well as in friendly conversations with l\1r. Hagman. (Tr. 93, 97, 98)
Counsel for respondent may claim that the issue
of a waiver ,~.·as not pleaded. We take the position that
under the new rules no ·waiver need be pleaded oocause
there is no provision in the new rules for the filing of
a reply. Under the old practice matters of confession
and avoidance had to be set forth in a reply, but now
no reply is provided for and surely one does not have
to plead anticipatory defenses as a part of the complaint.
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Second, we think the questions of wai \'er is raised
by the pleadiiig. Defendant ~a~,~ the plaintiff was
guilty of duress. Plaintiff denies there was duress.
An~, fact which showed there was no duress is admissible under the general issue.
Third, plaintiff did file a reply to the counterelaim of the defendant, wherein defendant sought to
recover the $1550.00 paid, and as to this issue the pleading was sufficient to raise the question of a waiver.
To each and all of the foregoing instructions and
requests the plaintiff duly expected. ( Tr. 133 to 135)
Point 7. It is plaintiff's contention that by reason of the manifest errors committed by the Trial Court
the Court should have granted plaintiff's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the ,-enlict as to both the
validity of the promissory note and the dismissal of the
defendant's counterclaim, but in any event plaintiff
contends that the motion for judgment should have
been granted as to the defendant's counterclaim.
Respectfully submitted
LeRoy B. Young of
THATCHER & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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